xln

XLN Mainnet Bar

Index Roadmap TODO

This file defines the release bar for real user funds. It is narrower than todo.md: the TODO explains what is active now; this file explains what must be true before mainnet is acceptable.

Owner decision, 2026-10-10: an external auditor is not a required launch gate. Codex performs and documents the engineering review; this is not independent external audit evidence. Exact financial assertions, security regression gates, recovery, native-chain verification and deployment/rollback evidence remain required. The owner signs mainnet deployment transactions himself.

For the current capped public-testnet / pre-mainnet launch loop, use the strict acceptance prompt and evidence loop in mainnet-acceptance-gate.md.

Historical position

Date: 2026-07-09 State recorded then: not mainnet-ready. Current scope and blockers are in todo.md; the following results apply only to this dated snapshot.

The current branch materially raised the floor: watchtower recovery is live, encrypted, scheduled, covered by browser E2E, direct same-chain/cross-j swaps and lending are in the fast E2E gate, bun run gate:release passed on the release line, bun run test:all:fast passed on 2026-07-08 with 95/95 isolated browser shards, bun run security:contract-governance, bun run security:consensus-hanko, bun run security:failure-taxonomy, and bun run security:delivery-boundary, bun run security:canonical-identity, bun run security:canonical-fill, bun run security:swap-cancel-canonical, and bun run security:audit-pack passed on 2026-07-09, and a historical release soak completed 13 full gate/benchmark iterations before being stopped manually. That is enough for serious public-testnet hardening. It is not enough for real funds because the full uninterrupted current mainnet-preflight soak and real mainnet ops are still open. Peer State Refresh is an optional third-line recovery aid, not a launch gate.

Signing boundary decision

Runtime is the policy-enforcement boundary. Signers authorize only the exact hashes produced by Runtime after deterministic RJEA validation and entity quorum; a separate signer or HSM must not attempt to reimplement that policy. RJEA is too stateful and protocol-specific to duplicate safely in generic key hardware, and two policy engines would create a divergence and upgrade hazard.

An HSM may still be used as optional key custody against raw-key extraction, but it is neither a mainnet gate nor a defense against compromise of a live Runtime that is authorized to request signatures. Operational controls, multisigner entity governance, backups, watchtowers, and fail-closed Runtime validation are the supported security boundaries. Do not reopen mandatory HSM or external policy-signer work without an explicit owner architecture change.

Public Testnet / Demo Scope

The current public-testnet/demo surface includes:

BrowserVM remains useful as a local simulator, but BrowserVM success alone is not evidence for mainnet readiness.

Mainnet Gates

All gates need a credible answer before launch.

1. Contract and J-layer correctness

Required:

Executable checks:

bun run test:e2e:coverage
bun run test:contracts:full
bun run test:rpc-settlement

2. Recovery and offline safety

Required:

Executable checks:

bun run test:persistence:cli
bun run test:e2e:full
bun run soak:quick

3. Runtime and consensus stability

Required:

Executable checks:

bun run gate:ci
bun run gate:release
bun run soak:release

Current evidence: bun run gate:release passed on the release line; bun run test:all:fast passed on 2026-07-08 and bun run security:audit-pack passed on 2026-07-09, including the runtime failure taxonomy scan. The historical long soak was manually stopped after 13 complete successful iterations, so it is useful evidence but not a completed gate. The current required soak evidence is the one-hour bun run gate:mainnet run from a clean tree.

4. Operational readiness

Required:

Executable checks:

bun run prod:health

5. Product-level safety boundaries

Required:

Required engineering security checks:

bun run security:contract-governance
bun run security:consensus-hanko
bun run security:failure-taxonomy
bun run security:delivery-boundary
bun run security:canonical-identity
bun run security:canonical-fill
bun run security:swap-cancel-canonical
bun run security:audit-pack

Optional external review brief: docs/security/external-audit-brief.md

The audit pack command must stay green. Per the owner’s 2026-10-10 decision, external audit sign-off is optional and does not block launch. Internal review must not be described as independent external assurance.

Things That Are Mainnet-Relevant But Not First-Launch Gates

Required Live Docs

Keep these files aligned before launch: