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This file defines the release bar for real user funds. It is narrower than
todo.md: the TODO explains what is active now; this file explains what must
be true before mainnet is acceptable.
Owner decision, 2026-10-10: an external auditor is not a required launch gate. Codex performs and documents the engineering review; this is not independent external audit evidence. Exact financial assertions, security regression gates, recovery, native-chain verification and deployment/rollback evidence remain required. The owner signs mainnet deployment transactions himself.
For the current capped public-testnet / pre-mainnet launch loop, use the strict acceptance prompt and evidence loop in mainnet-acceptance-gate.md.
Date: 2026-07-09 State recorded then: not mainnet-ready. Current scope and blockers are in todo.md; the following results apply only to this dated snapshot.
The current branch materially raised the floor: watchtower recovery is live,
encrypted, scheduled, covered by browser E2E, direct same-chain/cross-j swaps
and lending are in the fast E2E gate, bun run gate:release passed on the
release line, bun run test:all:fast passed on 2026-07-08 with 95/95 isolated
browser shards, bun run security:contract-governance,
bun run security:consensus-hanko, bun run security:failure-taxonomy, and
bun run security:delivery-boundary, bun run security:canonical-identity,
bun run security:canonical-fill, bun run security:swap-cancel-canonical,
and bun run security:audit-pack passed on 2026-07-09, and a
historical release soak completed 13 full gate/benchmark iterations before
being stopped manually. That is enough for serious public-testnet hardening. It
is not enough for real funds because the full uninterrupted current
mainnet-preflight soak and real mainnet ops are
still open. Peer State Refresh is an optional third-line recovery aid, not a
launch gate.
Runtime is the policy-enforcement boundary. Signers authorize only the exact hashes produced by Runtime after deterministic RJEA validation and entity quorum; a separate signer or HSM must not attempt to reimplement that policy. RJEA is too stateful and protocol-specific to duplicate safely in generic key hardware, and two policy engines would create a divergence and upgrade hazard.
An HSM may still be used as optional key custody against raw-key extraction, but it is neither a mainnet gate nor a defense against compromise of a live Runtime that is authorized to request signatures. Operational controls, multisigner entity governance, backups, watchtowers, and fail-closed Runtime validation are the supported security boundaries. Do not reopen mandatory HSM or external policy-signer work without an explicit owner architecture change.
The current public-testnet/demo surface includes:
processBatch contract integration on local Anvil/RPC;BrowserVM remains useful as a local simulator, but BrowserVM success alone is not evidence for mainnet readiness.
All gates need a credible answer before launch.
Required:
Executable checks:
bun run test:e2e:coverage
bun run test:contracts:full
bun run test:rpc-settlement
Required:
Executable checks:
bun run test:persistence:cli
bun run test:e2e:full
bun run soak:quick
Required:
Executable checks:
bun run gate:ci
bun run gate:release
bun run soak:release
Current evidence: bun run gate:release passed on the release line; bun run
test:all:fast passed on 2026-07-08 and bun run security:audit-pack passed on
2026-07-09, including the runtime failure taxonomy scan. The
historical long soak was manually stopped after 13 complete successful
iterations, so it is useful evidence but not a completed gate. The current
required soak evidence is the one-hour bun run gate:mainnet run from a clean
tree.
Required:
Executable checks:
bun run prod:health
Required:
Required engineering security checks:
bun run security:contract-governance
bun run security:consensus-hanko
bun run security:failure-taxonomy
bun run security:delivery-boundary
bun run security:canonical-identity
bun run security:canonical-fill
bun run security:swap-cancel-canonical
bun run security:audit-pack
Optional external review brief: docs/security/external-audit-brief.md
The audit pack command must stay green. Per the owner’s 2026-10-10 decision, external audit sign-off is optional and does not block launch. Internal review must not be described as independent external assurance.
Keep these files aligned before launch: