Pinned implementation baseline: 5d89c1ebbd7b4f6216db76a09ca30ff16bf3ca6c.
This preserves the original read-only research; its open items describe that
baseline. Later deadline work and verification are recorded in
the current implementation handoff. Use the
consolidated comparison for current framing.
Read-only xln baseline: 5d89c1ebbd7b4f6216db76a09ca30ff16bf3ca6c. No shared-tree edits, benchmarks, test execution or paid models. Sources inspected as code, not adoption proxies. References to tests mean inspected assertions, not freshly green results.
ce3d253cc5fbbedbb878a4f8722008ac954aeea3, /tmp/xln-research-raiden-contracts-ce3d253; prefix https://github.com/raiden-network/raiden-contracts/blob/ce3d253cc5fbbedbb878a4f8722008ac954aeea3/90cd5a6cc27e31088a39fd35c0dccf89871dfa88, /tmp/xln-research-raiden-client-90cd5a6; prefix https://github.com/raiden-network/raiden/blob/90cd5a6cc27e31088a39fd35c0dccf89871dfa88/d3b79fe3e4accf47e6cd930aa034002178a58655, /tmp/xln-research-raiden-light; prefix https://github.com/raiden-network/light-client/blob/d3b79fe3e4accf47e6cd930aa034002178a58655/64c4ee9a17f38939b393c647fb771313e7749043, /tmp/xln-research-raiden-nitro; prefix https://github.com/statechannels/go-nitro/blob/64c4ee9a17f38939b393c647fb771313e7749043/f431e3ded7ffeec2e1e2c3cf7b4eeb1854e1154a, /tmp/xln-research-raiden-counterfactual; prefix https://github.com/counterfactual/monorepo/blob/f431e3ded7ffeec2e1e2c3cf7b4eeb1854e1154a/1204ffc58cd47bbc0aaa08d8a39ec38d44f4fcae, /tmp/xln-research-raiden-perun; prefix https://github.com/hyperledger-labs/go-perun/blob/1204ffc58cd47bbc0aaa08d8a39ec38d44f4fcae/core/entity/paybook/lifecycle.ts:13,66–75 waits a fixed 120s after observing a secret; core/entity/scheduler/due-hooks.ts:46–57 defers another 120s if eight dispute starts fill the draft. Account admission needs only 30s enforcement reserve (core/account/consensus/dispute/deadline-policy.ts:7,35–43). Sequence: accept live upstream lock; settle downstream and learn secret; upstream withholds ACK; before the fixed timeout the upstream signed reveal deadline expires, or eight starts postpone reaction. Exercise this through real Runtime/WAL/J inclusion, compare secured rights on both legs. If reproduced, derive the existing scheduler deadline from the earliest signed lock deadline minus a configured J-inclusion budget; publish through the existing registry/start arguments and canonical outbox. No new durable oracle/cache. Starter evidence works only if start is timely: Account:1764/1797 binds evidence timestamp to J start; DeltaTransformer:278–286 checks that timestamp against the signed deadline. Finalize:157 independently queues public reveals, usually later. Test omitted from current ACK-timeout coverage, which asserts preparing the dispute rather than deadline-safe on-chain inclusion.Account.sol:863–1032 already executes arbitrary signed staticcall clauses with per-token allowances. core/protocol/dispute/proof-builder.ts:229–245 serializes existing subcontract entries. But AccountSubcontract has address/bytes/allowances only (core/types/account.ts:95); searches of AccountTx/EntityTx handlers found no wallet-authored clause admission/approval/CREATE2 execution path. docs/counterfactual-transformers.md is explicitly SPEC. Counterfactual has actual CREATE2 address derivation and deployment assertions (packages/node/src/utils/create2-address.ts:30–79; funding test/create2.spec.ts:55–96). Minimum artifact: compile a constructorless approved clause, independently reproduce bytecode/address, sign, restart, deploy only for dispute, enforce exact allowance-limited outcome. Then establish what generalized apps are deliberately outside xln’s financial model.Account.sol:863–938 says a clause is the executable signed right and must fail finalization on missing code/revert/OOG/malformed return. Foundry TransformerFaultModes.t.sol:122–153 explicitly asserts fail-closed. Skipping an option exercise clause could give the writer the raw signed balance despite a valid holder right. Preserve strict policy and require executable/admitted immutable clauses; do not convert rights to optional hints. A bad jointly signed clause can freeze settlement: allowances bound value movement, not liveness. Production code has a 2M post-call gas reserve, not the SPEC’s proposed fixed 1M-per-clause policy.core/watchtower/last-resort-appointment.ts:121–175) and latest appointment selection, so do not import Raiden’s registry/token bureaucracy. Its default eligibility is final 20% of the signed sum (:231–253); core/watchtower/action.ts sends the transaction using towerWallet, with no implemented reimbursement found. maxFeeToken/feeBudget are accepted optional HTTP metadata, not evidence of a payment engine. Smallest experiment: real funded tower, owner offline, exact signed appointment, stale adversarial close, gas spike, eight+ simultaneous disputes, tower restart, prove latest counterproof inclusion before timeout. Then choose a simple service subscription or explicit funded gas arrangement outside RJEA; on-chain rewards would be a real new protocol choice.Path shorthand TN=raiden_contracts/data/source/raiden/TokenNetwork.sol, SR=.../SecretRegistry.sol, MS=.../services/MonitoringService.sol; all resolve under pinned Raiden contracts above. Python paths resolve under pinned client, other paths explicit. Each row includes an adversarial sequence and next minimal check.
| Mechanism | Pinned upstream location | xln code / inspected test evidence | Assessment / adversarial sequence / minimal next check |
|---|---|---|---|
| Signature domain and stale proof | TN:1535–1620 binds network, chain, type, channel, nonce, balance hash | Account:523–606 binds chain/Depository/pair/nonce/proposer/body/watchseed; OnchainHankoDomain.test.ts:131,352 independent codecs | Already covered structurally. Replay same bytes against another chain/Depository/nonce; use existing contract domain suite, do not add aliases. |
| Opening and funded ownership | TN:249–294,1128–1184 creates unique active pair and deposited single token | Account:1170–1233 R2C; Depository:63–75 reserve/collateral/debt stores | Deliberate difference: xln account can operate with credit and multiple assets. Demonstrate zero-collateral funded claim vs unsecured debt explicitly; no need clone token-network-per-asset model. |
| Cooperative withdrawal race | TN:382–461 cumulative signed withdrawals; :484–514 cooperative settlement complete deposit | Account:1240–1300 C2R rejects dispute and stale nonce; current-board Hanko; proof-builder:448–456 next-nonce protection | Covered mechanism, exact concurrent proof/withdraw cross-layer experiment unverified. Two signed C2R same nonce plus prior dispute proof: only canonical nonce outcome; then current proof remains enforceable. |
| Unilateral close and update | TN:558–700 close/update;1187–1204 strict higher nonce | Account:635–807 finalize selection; :1333 onward counterproof lock; equal-nonce left precedence | Deliberate richer xln branch rule. Submit initial close then newer counterproof then old finalize in same batch; old proof must not settle. Existing dispute monotonicity tests inspected; no universal regression gap asserted. |
| Settlement conservation | TN:763–882 verifies transferred/locked/root, clamps to deposited balances | Depository:900–1004 wide delta, earmarked collateral, reserves, remaining debt; TransformerAllowance/DepositoryConservation foundry suites present | xln superset financially: preserves debt rather than pretend unsecured value collateralized. Simultaneous exits test earmarked rights separately from free reserve first-mover effects. |
| Pending locks commitment | TN:1461–1484 hashes concatenated 96-byte locks, :894–973 unlocks full set | proof-builder:178–190 signed bounded payment clauses; constants:59 max32 locks | Deliberate bounded representation. Current pinned Raiden is not Merkle inclusion unlock; historical Merkle wording would misdescribe this implementation. Max32 proof/restart/dispute closes all rights within budget. |
| Public secret / shared preimage | SR:18–38 first-seen immutable timestamp, batches repeats harmless | DeltaTransformer:404–415 same idempotent immutable timestamp; SecretRevealLiveness.test.ts:7–26 | Already covered. Replay reveal at later block never refreshes deadline; shared secret unlocks all matching signed payments. Do not add second registry. |
| Deadline exactness | TN:1487–1516 requires reveal strictly before unlockable_until | DeltaTransformer:273–286 accepts <= signed seconds; proof-builder:180 converts exclusive ms via exclusiveUnixMsBigIntToUnixS; Account htlc-deadline.ts:11–25 | Covered via representation difference, not automatically off-by-one bug. Verify deadline-1ms/deadline/exclusive-second boundaries through conversion and J timestamps. |
| Reveal danger zone | Python mediator.py:90–111,735–789,805 onward registers known secret before unsafe wait or closed channel | lifecycle:66–75 fixed120s; due-hooks:46–57 queue deferral; start-evidence:170–212 starter arguments | Missing combined production timing evidence; candidate described above. Smallest real-WAL stalled-ACK/J inclusion regression before changing scheduler. |
| Expiry / reorg grace | Python channel.py:183–202 sender2x/receiver1x confirmation grace;315–340 on-chain-known secret blocks expiry | htlc-deadline exclusive timestamp/inclusive Jheight; deadline-policy pure local enforcement; watcher rpc-watcher-canonical.ts:113–145 authenticated rewind | Deliberate finality architecture. Unfinalized reveal reorg must not mutate committed Entity truth, while finalized contradiction fail-stops. Need focused combined expiry/reorg artifact if absent; no code gap claimed. |
| Retry and route identity | Python channel.py:817 refund identity, raiden_service.py payment IDs; network/pathfinding.py:702–732 feedback | committed-htlc-followups.ts:108–138 Entity-wide live hashlock collision guard; persisted verified secret, exact frame binding :83–99 | Already covered core one-live-payment identity, not full multipath promises. Delayed old route message after cancel/retry with fresh hash must not replace active route. |
| Route fees / liquidity | Python network/pathfinding.py:467–501 signed cumulative IOU; routing.py:193–235 filters candidate first hop; feedback:702 | pathfinding graph.ts:113, materialize-context.ts:224–242 derives capacity/directional fee and rejects short deadlines | PFS feedback is optional operational optimization. Avoid global consensus liquidity registry. Measure whether repeated stale route attempts waste capacity before adding runtime-only hint caching. |
| Tower authority | MS:112–167 validates registry/reward signature and latest nonce | last-resort-appointment.ts:121–175 narrow owner Hanko; action.ts verifies exact proof+event+latest nonce; watchtower-last-resort.test.ts:90,207,630,792 | Already covered cryptographic delegation, xln narrower financial authority. Malformed/stale tower never spends reserves or picks an unsigned state. |
| Tower economics | MS:238–363 deterministic stagger and signed reward | last-resort-appointment final20%; action.ts actual tower tx; HTTP optional feeBudget not payment execution | Service funding/inclusion evidence gap. Run funded offline-owner correlated-exit scenario; do not automatically add service token, registry, or durable reward state. |
| Generic application transitions | Nitro ForceMove.sol:39–79,218–232 uses app-specific supported-state relation; Counterfactual MixinRespondToChallenge.sol:25–89 turn-taker action; Perun channel/adjudicator.go:32–98 Register/Progress/Withdraw | Account:863–1032 only signed financial transformer evaluation; no equivalent generic unilateral turn-taking API found | Deliberate scope difference until a financial application needs forced intermediate progression. Static financial settlement clauses do not establish every generic app’s force-progress liveness. Construct a representative option/escrow financial right first; avoid a generic framework detour. |
| Counterfactual deployment | Counterfactual create2-address.ts:30–79 and test/create2.spec.ts:55–96 implemented address+deployment | docs/counterfactual-transformers SPEC; no AccountTx/EntityTx custom clause approval/deploy handlers found; proof-builder merely reads existing entries | Real implementation gap for wallet-authored custom clauses. Produce one real compile/sign/restart/deploy/finalize path before broad superset claim. |
| Clause fault semantics | Counterfactual ConditionalTransactionDelegateTarget.sol:122–146 propagates failed interpreter execution | Account:863–938 strict failure; TransformerFaultModes.t.sol:122–153 failures tested; SPEC proposes skip | Verified doc mismatch. Skipping signed financial meaning destroys rights; preserve strict execution. Wallet admission/immutable artifact is the improvement. |
| Hierarchical locked sub-apps | Perun channel/adjudicator.go:64–80 requires signed child states in register/withdraw; Counterfactual freebalance activeApps in ConditionalTransactionDelegateTarget.sol:101–128 | xln subcontracts in one signed ProofBody, 32 clause max; no isolated per-clause adjudication found | Do not copy recursive settlement by default. If one broken jointly signed clause freezes otherwise valid obligations, design choice is admitted bounded clauses or independent financial Accounts; isolated child settlement is materially new protocol. |
Examined actual Raiden close/update/settle/withdraw/unlock, registry timestamps, Python expiry/grace/danger-zone/refund checks, light-client reorg action handling, services fee/reward binding; xln domain/nonces, deadline predicates, starter arguments, queue/finalize ordering, public registry, route identity, proof/allowance/fault handling, tower authority; Counterfactual CREATE2 and turn-taking, Nitro app support predicate, Perun API/watcher intent.
Omitted: exhaustive all-history Raiden contracts/client revision changes; complete light-client/Python WAL crash replay; Perun EVM backend implementation (Go API is not contract proof); every arbitrary financial application’s representation/liveness theorem; all gas schedules/hardware capacities; full upstream or xln test execution. This is a detailed bounded mechanism study, not evidence that every edge case across all projects is exhausted.
XLNC owner scope preserved: conventional stateful EVM J, lower block gas, ordinary rebalance/disputes, phone/laptop full nodes. None of these recommendations requires stateless witnesses, ZK, a new ledger, or changed J/E/A ownership.